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suggests the importance of
grand corruption in some
countries, manifested in
state capture by the
corporate sector—through
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Summary findings
As a symptom of fundamental institutional weaknesses,
corruption needs to be viewed within a broader
governance framework. It thrives where the state is
unable to reign over its bureaucracy, to protect property
and contractual rights, or to provide institutions that
support the rule of law. Furthermore, governance
failures at the national level cannot be isolated from the
interface between the corporate and state sectors, in
particular from the heretofore underemphasized
influence that firms may exert on the state. Under
certain conditions, corporate strategies may exacerbate
misgovernance at the national level.
An in-depth empirical assessment of the links between
corporate behavior and national governance can thus
provide particular insights. The 1999 Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS)—the transition economies component of the
ongoing World Business Environment Survey—assesses
in detail the various dimensions of governance from the
perspective of about 3,000 firms in 20 countries. After
introducing the survey framework and measurement
approach, Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, and
Schankerman present the survey results, focusing on
governance, corruption, and state capture.
By unbundling governance into its many dimensions,
BEEPS permits an in-depth empirical assessment. The
authors pay special attention to certain forms of grand
corruption, notably state capture by parts of the
corporate sector—that is, the propensity of firms to
shape the underlying rules of the game by “purchasing”
decrees, legislation, and influence at the central bank,
which is found to be prevalent in a number of
transition economies. The survey also measures other
dimensions of grand corruption, including those
associated with public procurement, and quantifies the
more traditional (“pettier”) forms of corruption.
Cross-country surveys may suffer from bias if firms
tend to systematically over- or underestimate the extent
of problems within their country. The authors provide a
new test for this potential bias, finding little evidence of
country perception bias in BEEPS.
This paper—a joint product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute, and the Chief Economist’s
Office, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development—is part of a larger program to measure governance and
corruption worldwide. A companion paper that econometrically analyzes the effects of state capture is forthcoming. For
further details, please visit http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance. Copies of this paper are available free from the World
Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC  20433. Please contact Diane Bouvet, Room J3-273, telephone 202-473-5818,
fax 202-334-8350, email dbouvet@worldbank.org. This paper is also available on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/
wbi/governance/working_papers.htm. The authors may be contacted at dkaufmann@worldbank.org or hellmanj@ebrd.com.
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1. Introduction
The search for effective methods of combating corruption has led to an increasingly wide
recognition that corruption is fundamentally a problem of governance. Corruption thrives where
states are too weak to control their own bureaucrats, to protect property and contract rights, and
to provide the institutions that underpin an effective rule of law. Consequently, recent studies of
corruption have tended to focus on key characteristics and policies of the state, especially the
extent of state intervention in the economy and the degree of discretionary power of
bureaucrats.
1 Yet the recognition that corruption is a symptom of the underlying weakness of
the state, while important, has shifted the focus of analysis away from firms.
2 The links
between corporate governance and national governance have been largely unexplored.
Moreover, empirical efforts to assess governance and corruption across countries have
generally overlooked the critical information that firms can provide about the nature and extent
of these problems.
The 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), building upon
the World Bank’s survey carried out for the World Development Report in 1997
3 and the
ongoing World Business Environment Survey, was designed to assess the quality of governance
across 20 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from a firm-
level perspective.
4 This perspective provides a number of advantages.  First, it allows us to
explore the relationship between different characteristics of firms (such as ownership, control,
size, sector, etc.) and their effects on the firms’ interactions with the state. Second, it provides
an opportunity to investigate in depth the types of “services” for which firms pay bribes and the
characteristics of these transactions. Third, it provides a micro-economic perspective on the
costs and benefits to firms associated with corruption and different levels of governance.
Most importantly, the firm-level perspective provides one of the first opportunities to analyse
empirically the problem of “state capture,” that is, the efforts of firms to shape and influence
the underlying rules of the game (i.e. legislation, laws, rules, and decrees) through private
payments to public officials.  There has been analysis of how firms in the transition economies
use their political influence to distort both the legal framework and the policymaking process in
an effort to gain concentrated rents with detrimental consequences for the economy and society
at large.
5 The BEEPS provides the first opportunity to explore empirically the methods and
mechanisms by which firms seek to influence the state, providing a new perspective on the
phenomenon of state capture in the region and opening insights into larger questions of the
political economy of reform.
The BEEPS was designed to push further the empirical frontier in the analysis of governance
and corruption at the country and firm levels.  Most existing cross-country surveys of
governance and corruption rely on the subjective views of outsiders, namely expert
assessments, country analysts or foreign investors.
6 Governance is often defined quite narrowly,
                                                     
1 For example, see the World Development Report (1997).
2 An exception is the recent work by Shleifer and Vishny (1994).
3 See Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997).
4 The BEEPS is the first stage of a world-wide survey of firms on the obstacles in the business environment conducted by the
World Bank in co-operation with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Inter-American Development
Bank and the Harvard Institute for International Development.  It is anticipated that over 100 countries will be included in the
survey encompassing countries at all levels of development.   An earlier version of the World Business Environment Survey,
comprising 69 countries, was carried out 1996 and presented in the World Bank’s World Development Report 1997 (the data are
available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/gac).  Some of the data from the BEEPS were first published in the EBRD’s Transition
Report (1999).
5  See Aslund (1999) and Hellman (1998).
6  The most frequently used index of corruption is Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which is a survey of
surveys based on outside assessments of corruption and on a particular methodology subject to changes over time (as well as its
country coverage, which even though it has grown over the years, currently covers only about one-half of all countries for which
there is data).  At any rate, any such aggregate comparative index will have serious limitations in diagnosing in-depth governance
and corruption challenges within a country.  For that purpose, a new set of diagnostic survey tools (for public officials, enterprises
and citizens) have been developed under a separate project to help countries in addressing governance challenges (Kaufmann,
Pradhan and Ryterman, 1998).5
taking a uni-dimensional view of the state’s role in the economy or assessing the rule of law
broadly defined.  Corruption is typically limited to bribery and focused primarily on what is
often described as “petty corruption” or “grease payments”.  The results of such surveys are
thus highly subjective and estimated with a large margin of error that inhibits cross-country
comparisons.
7  Moreover, the assessment of governance and corruption as broad catch-all
categories has not proven to be an effective tool for developing specific and well-targeted
policy advice for governments, civil society and IFIs in these areas.
The BEEPS has a range of features to ensure higher reliability and greater depth in assessing
these problems. Questions are based on the direct experience of firms rather than subjective
comparisons across countries.  Where possible, numerical cardinal estimates of problems are
used (such as share of annual revenue spent on bribes) as opposed to subjective assessments of
the extent of the problem. Data on firm-level performance in terms of sales, investment and
employment provide specific estimates of the costs and benefits to firms associated with
governance issues.  These estimates enable us to measure the margin of error on many
questions, which is explicitly depicted in many charts contained in the paper.
By defining governance in terms of a number of distinct dimensions, the BEEPS provides a
much more detailed and in-depth understanding of the nature of governance problems.  The
survey contains individual modules on taxes and regulation, macroeconomic management,
physical infrastructure, competition and the provision of law and order. On corruption, the
survey includes questions that distinguish among different forms of corruption, different
recipients of bribes, and key characteristics of corrupt transactions. Moreover, the BEEPS
represents the first major attempt to provide sound empirical measures of various forms of
“grand” corruption, such as ‘state capture’ (purchase of laws and decrees by enterprises) as
well as corruption in public procurement, and to measure the characteristics of firms that
engage in such forms of corruption.
This is mostly a descriptive paper summarising the results of a subset of questions from the
BEEPS relating to governance and corruption, as well as detailing the sample structure and
methodology employed.  For most questions, the results are reported at the country level,
though the variation across different types of firms across countries is presented in some cases
as well. Several indices are also constructed on the basis of different dimensions of governance
to provide summary measures of broader concepts. We also address the problem of  'country
perception bias', defined as the tendency of respondents from any country to systematically
over- or under-estimate the extent of problems within their own country.  A simple method for
evaluating the extent of country perception bias is implemented, with little evidence found
pointing to such bias in the BEEPS.
This paper is the first in this empirical project whose objective is to deepen our understanding
of the linkages between corporate governance and national governance and how such
interactions shape the environment faced by businesses in different countries.  A forthcoming
companion paper will analyse the characteristics and consequences of state capture in detail.
                                                     
7 For an analysis of existing governance and corruption indicators, see Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a and b).6
2. The survey instrument
Background on the questionnaire
The BEEPS questionnaire for the transition economies was developed jointly by the World
Bank
 8 and the Office of the Chief Economist at the EBRD.
9 The survey presented here was
implemented during the period June through August 1999 in the following countries:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland,
Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan.
Structure of the questionnaire
The questionnaire has two separate parts:
An initial “screener” questionnaire contains questions on the characteristics of the responding
firm covering ownership, area of major activity, number of employees and internationalisation
(including degree of foreign ownership and level of exports).  These questions, in addition to
providing information on the responding firm for use in its own right, were used to establish
sample quotas.  The sample selection procedure will be described in section 3.
The main questionnaire contains over 70 questions.  The focus of this paper is on the
governance-related questions; other questions will be addressed elsewhere.  The aspects of the
investment climate with which the survey deals can be classified broadly into macro- and
micro- dimensions as follows:
Institutions and policies – macro-dimensions
This section deals with a broad range of issues relating to the efficiency and efficacy of
government institutions and policies.  Firms were asked to rate the quality of public services
across a number of dimensions including central government, parliament, the judiciary, utilities
and the police, and to evaluate how serious various institutional obstacles are for their business,
ranging across macro- and micro-economic policy, crime and corruption.  Questions were asked
about the legal system and its ability to protect property and contract rights and the
predictability and transparency of policy making.  Finally, firms were asked about the extent to
which they use barter, which is symptomatic of major institutional failure.
Bureaucracy, state intervention and corruption – micro-dimensions
In contrast to the above questions which focus on the public goods and institutional
environment provided or not provided by the state, the second set of questions investigates the
nature of the direct interactions between firms and the state.  This includes not only an analysis
of the extent and types of state intervention in the operations of firms, but also the ways in
which firms seek to influence the state.  On corruption, firms were asked about the extent and
frequency of bribery, the recipients of bribes and the nature of the corrupt transaction.  Finally,
firms were asked about the specific benefits they receive from the state in the form of subsidies
and toleration of arrears.
                                                     
8 The team at the World Bank comprised Daniel Kaufmann, Homi Kharas, Syamm Khemani, Guy Pfefferman, Andy Stone and
Geeta Batra.  We are grateful to Randi Ryterman for contributing to the BEEPS questionnaire.
9 The team at the EBRD comprised Steven Fries, Joel Hellman and Mark Schankerman.7
3. Implementation and methodology
The survey instrument was prepared in English and then translated into the national language of
each country.  To ensure accuracy of translation the survey was independently translated back
into English. The survey was extensively piloted in each of the countries in which it was
implemented to ensure that respondents correctly understood the questions.  As a quality-
control measure, a sub-sample of respondents was telephoned on the following day and the
responses to key questions checked for consistency.
The selection of a representative sample of firms is crucial if inferences are to be drawn which
apply beyond those firms interviewed.  Sample selection took place in several stages.  The
government statistical office was contacted in each of the countries where the survey was
conducted to obtain a breakdown of enterprises by industry sector, number of employees and
location.  Some judgement was necessary as there was considerable variation in the amount of
information available in each country.  This prior information was then used to construct a
sample frame with quotas placed on the number of enterprises to be sampled in these
categories.  In addition, quotas were placed on the number of state-owned and private sector
firms and the number of firms with foreign ownership. However, no attempt was made to
construct a representative sample across these ownership strata and the quotas were designed
only to ensure representation.  The prior information that would be required to weight the
sample in proportion to the universe of firms is unavailable in most of the countries covered by
the survey.
The precise parameters of the quotas are as follows:
•  Industry sector: The number of manufacturing versus service companies was allocated
according to their contribution to GDP with a 15% minimum for each.
•  Number of employees: At least 15% of the firms were required to have under 50 employees
and 15% were required to have over 200 employees.
•  Location: At least 15% of the firms were required to be located in towns of fewer than
50,000 inhabitants or in rural areas.
•  Ownership: At least 15% of the firms were required to have majority foreign ownership (or
where this is prohibited by law, foreign ownership close to the legal maximum).
•  Exporters: At least 15% of the firms were required to export at least 20% of their output.
•  State Ownership: 20% of the firms were required to be state-owned.
Firms were sampled randomly from business directories or the Yellow Pages and the initial
screener questionnaire conducted by telephone to select firms fulfilling the quota restrictions.
After conducting the initial screener interview and securing the co-operation of the firm, the
main questionnaire was carried out in a face-to-face interview by local interviewers trained
according to a common format.  This is the most effective method of implementing such a long
questionnaire as postal surveys tend to suffer from a low response rate.  This is particularly true
in the transition countries since postal surveys tend to be associated with the bureaucracy of the
Communist era.  Further, telephone interviews do not generate a conducive atmosphere to deal
with the sensitive issues covered by the survey.  In all countries the survey was conducted by
local staff of the international survey firm, A.C. Nielsen, to ensure consistency of training and
approach across countries.8
Addressing Perception Respondent Bias in Cross-Country Surveys
Despite this methodology, a potential source of bias remains with respect to making cross-
country comparisons.  A respondent can be said to exhibit perception bias if he rates a problem
more or less severely than would an objective observer (assuming of course that the survey
question corresponds to an objectively measurable concept).  Some respondents could be said
to have an inherent tendency to kvetch (i.e. to "complain, gripe, grunt, or sigh") or to kvell (i.e.
to "beam with immense pride and pleasure").
10  In general, such individual perception bias
would only contribute to the standard error of the survey estimates without causing bias at the
aggregate level.  However, this conclusion requires that the perception bias be uncorrelated
among the group of individuals aggregated in the survey.  In cross-country surveys, there is
always a concern that the individual biases could be correlated across respondents in any given
country thus making the country aggregates correspondingly biased. In other words, some
countries could generate a greater tendency for kvetching or kvelling among the respondents.
There are a variety of factors which could generate such a country perception bias including
differences in national character and culture, differences in the degree of openness of
respondents associated with alternative political systems or nation-wide factors related to the
particular time period in which the survey was implemented (such as the recent exposure to a
macroeconomic crisis or government corruption scandal). In this paper, an attempt is made to
investigate such potential bias by examining the relationship between the respondents’
perceptions of certain concrete, measurable problems (such as infrastructure capacity or
exchange rate variability) in the economy and objective measures of those same problems
external to the survey.
11
The external measures chosen were:
•  Exchange rate variability
12 defined as the standard deviation of the real exchange rate
(measured monthly and normalised at the beginning of the period) with the US dollar over
the twelve months prior to implementing the survey;
•  Telephone infrastructure
13 defined as the number of telephone lines per capita (measured in
1997, the latest available year).
The corresponding survey questions were:
•  Rate the overall quality and efficiency of the services delivered by the telephone service
(on a scale ranging from 1 - very good to 6 - very bad);
•  How problematic is the exchange rate for the operation and growth of your business? (on a
scale ranging from 1 - no obstacle to 4 - major obstacle).
Country indices of both infrastructure and exchange rate variability were calculated from the
mean response to each question and these indices were compared to the external measures.  A
significant relationship between the internal and external measures is evidence that there is
                                                     
10 These definitions come from Rosten (1968).
11 The problem of perception bias has been recognised before.  In particular, see Kaufmann and Wei (1999) and Kaufmann and
Zoido-Lobatón (1999b). The first of these papers is concerned with controlling the bias at the level of individual respondents, in the
context of regression analysis.  In that context, any country-level bias can be controlled using country fixed effects (although it
cannot then be disentangled from other country effects) and the only issue remaining is to control for unduly optimistic or
pessimistic individuals relative to the country effect.  This does not require any information external to the survey.  What we are
concerned with here is precisely the discrimination between country bias and other country effects since the paper is concerned only
with cross-country comparisons.  For that we require external information. The second paper is concerned with country level bias.
The role of the external information that we employ here is filled by the assumption that the foreign firms in any given country
provide more objective assessments than their purely domestic counterparts.
12 Source: EBRD calculations
13 Source: World Development Report 1999 (and originally International Telecommunication Union)9
little country bias in that question.
14 In addition, the examination of any outliers points to
countries which may be cause for concern.
15
The diagrams in figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the relationship between the internal and external
indices together with a regression line, associated R
2 and dotted lines at two standard deviations
from the estimated line.  For both survey measures, higher numbers reflect greater pessimism.
Observations beyond two standard deviations can be considered outliers.
16
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14 In particular, the R
2 indicates the proportion of variation in the survey response which can be attributable to variation in the
objective quantity relative to the proportion attributable to country bias.
15 This simple methodology attributes any cross-country differences in the survey beyond that predicted by the external indicator
solely to bias. It should be borne in mind, however, that there will be other factors which are unaccounted for.  In addition, the two
survey indices do not correspond perfectly to the external measures.  Exchange rate variability may be more or less important to
firms in different countries depending on their exposure to international transactions.  The number of telephone lines per capita may
be only weakly related to the actual quality of service.  Finally one must be willing to assume that measurement of the bias on these
particular questions carries information about the potential bias on the remaining questions which cannot be corroborated.  These
caveats should recognised when interpreting the results.
16 This is intended to be suggestive rather than a precise statistical test.10
Given the limitations of the methodology, the diagrams above support the assumption that the BEEPS data
do not suffer significantly from country perception bias
17.  The residuals show no systematic pattern, with
the exception of some doubts raised concerning overly pessimistic responses in Armenia.
4. Characteristics of responding firms
Table 4.1 describes the sample composition across the countries of implementation, according to the
origin of the firm (state, privatised or new entrant), foreign ownership and geographical location.


















Armenia 125 63 34 25 2 63 0 62
Azerbaijan 137 93 17 25 13 79 0 58
Belarus 132 50 56 25 15 31 22 79
Bulgaria 130 77 26 25 17 12 66 52
Croatia 127 34 66 27 17 44 0 83
Czech Republic 149 113 10 25 33 51 16 82
Estonia 132 73 26 25 26 55 0 77
Georgia 129 75 29 25 18 55 22 52
Hungary 147 94 24 25 27 51 0 96
Kazakhstan 147 69 47 27 27 15 74 58
Kyrgyzstan 132 50 57 25 15 38 0 94
Lithuania 112 84 26 0 6 24 4 84
Moldova 139 47 57 25 16 57 0 82
Poland 246 160 53 25 40 38 83 125
Romania 125 85 15 25 20 19 54 52
Russia 552 283 230 25 37 87 232 233
Slovakia 138 84 26 25 15 16 19 103
Slovenia 125 41 54 25 17 46 23 56
Ukraine 247 147 73 25 30 37 88 122
Uzbekistan 126 44 52 25 18 35 0 91
The section below presents the relevant questions from the screener questionnaire and
additional questions from the main questionnaire relating to firm characteristics.  Since the
purpose of this section is simply to illustrate the sample diversity, the results for individual
countries are not presented.  The survey succeeded in sampling a wide variety of firms within
the constraints imposed by the sample quotas, which lends confidence to the results.  Firms
varied in a number of characteristics including the geographical location of the firm; state or
private ownership; area of main activity; number of employees; internationalisation; major
trading partners; control of firm decisions; number of majority shareholders; identify of
majority shareholder and the origin of the firm.
                                                     
17 This is very much a preliminary approach to the issue.  A more thorough analysis would examine other external measures and
could be carried out at the micro-level to control for differences in firm characteristics affecting the outcomes, which are here
attributed to bias.  Ultimately one would hope to provide methods to quantify and then control for the bias.  Future papers will
pursue these issues.11
Geographical location of the firm
Firms were sampled in towns of all sizes from the capital to small towns with under 50,000 inhabitants.
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of firms by the size of the town.
Figure 4.2:  Distribution of surveyed firms by size of town
Capital
26%

















Figure 4.3 illustrates the distribution of firms by their type of legal organisation.





























Main area of activity
A quota was placed on the area of activity of the firm to ensure firms were sampled from both the
manufacturing industries and the services sector.  Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of firms by area of
main activity.




























Figure 4.5 illustrates the distribution of firms by the number of full-time employees.  Firm size was taken
as the number of full-time employees.  Although firms were asked about full-time and casual staff, 65% of
firms stated that they employed no casual staff, and 86% employed fewer than 10 casual staff.
Figure 4.5: How many full-time employees and casual staff in total work for this company?
10 to 49







8% 1 to 9
27%13
State ownership
Perceptions of the investment climate may depend to some extent on the financial ties that the firm has
with the state.  Firms were asked if any state organisation or state agency had a financial stake in their
organisation and the size of the stake as a proportion of the organisation’s capital.  The state had a
financial stake in 22% of the firms sampled and the average size of the stake was 66%.
Foreign ownership
There are various aspects to the degree of internationalisation of the firm.  Below we consider whether any
foreign firm holds a financial stake in the firm and the size of the stake.  Figure 4.6 shows the percentage
of firms with a foreign financial stake and the nationality of the foreign partner.
Figure 4.6: Does any foreign company have a financial stake in your organisation?





Firms were asked what proportion of their capital was held by foreign owners.  Of the 8% of firms with
some foreign financial stake, the average size of the stake was 55%.14
Main trading partners
The firms’ perceptions of the business environment may also be conditional on their main trading
partners.  In particular, figure 4.7 considers the proportion of firms that have holdings overseas, that
export their goods and services and that trade with the state sector.
Figure 4.7: Does your firm have holdings or operations in other countries?
Does your firm sell its products or services to customers outside the country?




























In addition, firms were asked to identify the proportion of their sales represented by exports. Of the 28%
of firms exporting, the average percentage of exports in sales was 33.7%. Fifty-two percent of the firms
report trade with the state; the average percentage of sales was 31%.
Ownership of firms
In considering issues related to corporate governance, it is useful to know how dispersed is the ownership
of the company and who the majority shareholders are, and in particular whether they can be viewed as
insiders or outsiders.
Figure 4.8 illustrates the dispersion of ownership, and Figure 4.9 illustrates the distribution of majority
ownership.










Figure 4.9: Which of the following best describes the type of owner which now has the largest stake in


























As for the degree of change in ownership, only 15% of the firms which had existed for more than three
years had experienced a change in the majority shareholder in the past three years.
Control of firm decisions
The survey investigates various issues related to corporate governance, including control of firm
decisions, the nature and degree of dispersion of ownership, and changes of management.  Figure 4.10
illustrates the distribution of firms according to control of firm decisions.
Figure 4.10: Which of the following best describes the control of your firm, where control means making
























The survey also asked how the control of decisions has changed in the last three years.  There was no
significant difference in the overall distribution compared to that illustrated above.
Origins of the firm
Figure 4.11 shows the distribution of firm origins. This identifies differences in the origins of private
sector firms depending essentially on whether the firm was established privately with no state-owned
predecessor, or whether the firm was created as a result of the privatisation of a state-owned firm. The16
perceptions of the business environment by these different groups of private firms may differ to the extent
that their interactions with the state take different forms.













Privatization of a 
state-owned firm
27%
Eighty percent of the firms were founded after 1989, although dates of establishment for the overall
sample ranged between 1806 and 1999.  The majority of the private firms in the sample were established
as such, with no state-owned predecessor.
Management turnover
A further dimension of corporate governance is the selection and replacement of management.  To portray
the mobility of senior staff, Figure 4.12 shows the percentage of firms that have experienced a change of
general manager, and what precipitated the change. Figure 4.13 shows whether the replacement was an
insider or outsider to the firm.
Figure 4.12: Has there been a change of general manager in the last three years?













Figure 4.13: Has there been a change of general manager in the last three years?













Every effort was made to interview senior staff, well qualified to represent the company.  The respondents
were most often Owner/Proprietors and Directors, both with approximately 23% of respondents.  Other
respondents included Finance Officer (17%) and Chief Executive (16%).
5. The investment climate: the micro- and macro- dimensions of
governance
Conventions adopted in presenting the results
This section presents the main results of the survey.  For most questions the respondents were asked to
choose the most appropriate answer from a linear scale list of up to six choices.  For these questions the
graphs below illustrate by country the percentage of firms with responses in the two or three extreme
categories (depending on the number of choices), and (except for the star charts – see box 5.1 below) the
proportion of firms in each of those categories is shown in a different colour.
For questions with free-responses the means have been reported.  For questions in which the categories
represented ranges of numerical values, an imputed free variable has been calculated as the midpoint of
the category, or the lower endpoint of an open-ended category, and again the mean presented.  On each
bar chart, an error bar represents the standard error of the sample estimates.
The convention that has been adopted in reporting the data is as follows:
•  if the question concerns a “good” (for example, the quality of public services in figure 5.2 below),
then larger numbers represent more desirable outcomes and
•  if the question concerns a “bad” (for example, corruption in figure 5.6) then larger numbers represent
less desirable outcomes.
The data have not been weighted so the views of small firms carry as much weight as those of their larger
counterparts.18
Box 5.1 – Interpretation of star charts
Star charts are useful for summarising the responses to a group of related questions.  In the
diagrams in this paper, each country is represented by a single star and each axis of the star
represents one of the component questions.  The length of the axis is proportional to the percentage
of firms responding in the stated categories, thus in figure 5.2 below the length of each axis is
proportional to the number of firms responding in categories 1, 2 or 3.  To fix the scale, a final star
represents the theoretical extreme of 100% of responses falling in those categories.  Such diagrams
illustrate two important aspects of the data: Within each country, the shape of the star illustrates the
relative importance (measured by the proportion of responding firms) of each of the component
issues addressed in the questions.  In addition, by comparing the diameters of the stars it is possible
to measure the differing importance of the entire group of issues across different countries.
Institutions and policies – macro dimensions of governance
The quality of public institutions
The most direct measurement of the quality of governance is obtained by evaluating the performance of
state institutions. Respondents were asked to assess and compare the performance of all the major public
institutions.  For this type of question comprising a comparison across a group of related sub-questions the
results will be presented as a star chart (see Box 5.1).  The institutions are divided into central government
functions and sectoral functions.
Figure 5.2: Could you please rate the overall quality and efficiency of services delivered by the following
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Russia Slovakia Slovenia Ukraine Uzbekistan
100% (Very Good)19
Figure 5.3: Could you please rate the overall quality and efficiency of services delivered by the
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Russia Slovakia Slovenia Ukraine Uzbekistan
100% (Very Good)
Institutional obstacles to business
The defining characteristic of the investment climate is the extent to which institutional and policy
problems place constraints on the performance of firms. Respondents were asked to evaluate the
significance of eleven key institutional constraints.  Figure 5.4 presents the responses in the star chart
form.  Figure 5.5 presents indices calculated as the mean response aggregated across several dimensions.

























Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bulgaria Croatia
Czech Republic Estonia Georgia Hungary Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania
Russia Slovakia Slovenia Ukraine Uzbekistan
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 Law and order
 Infrastructure
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Major Obstacle
The components of each of the aggregate indices in figure 5.5 are as follows:
•  Microeconomic governance: comprising taxes and regulations
•  Macroeconomic governance: comprising policy instability, exchange rate and inflation
•  Law and order: comprising functioning of the judiciary, corruption, street crime and organised
crime.
•  Infrastructure: no sub-components
Corruption
Corruption is often cited as the major institutional constraint on business.  Conventionally,
corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain.  However, this definition
encompasses a range of practices which are differentiated here.  This section discusses the
macro-dimensions of corruption, by which is meant the impact of various forms of corruption at
a national level.  The micro-dimensions concerning specific characteristics of corrupt
transactions are discussed later.
For the first time, the survey measures grand corruption which is defined as private payments
to public officials to influence the content of the basic rules of the game (i.e. legislation, rules,
laws or decrees). As a result of grand corruption, key state institutions can be “captured” by
private interests to skew the policy-making process in favour of particular firms and render the
operation of government non-transparent. The survey also measures patronage  and  petty
corruption of the sort that individuals and firms encounter in their direct dealings with the state.
Attempts to compare the amount of corruption between different countries are fraught with
difficulties.  Bribery is usually illegal and firms must be expected to be reluctant to admit that
they pay bribes.  In implementing the survey, the problems associated with collecting reliable
data were kept constantly in mind, and every effort was made to assure respondents that their
answers would be treated confidentially.  Questions were phrased indirectly about the
corruption faced by “firms in your line of business” and respondents were assured that
responses would be aggregated and not attributable to themselves or their firms.21
To develop a measure of the impact of corruption and capture on the business environment,
firms were asked to what extent the following forms of corruption have had an impact on their
business:
•  sale of Parliamentary votes on laws to private interests;
•  sale of Presidential decrees to private interests;
•  Central Bank mishandling of funds;
•  sale of court decisions in criminal cases;
•  sale of court decisions in arbitration cases;
•  contributions paid by private interests to political parties and election campaigns;
•  patronage, defined as public officials hiring their friends and relatives to official positions;
and
•  bribes paid to public officials to avoid taxes and regulations.
Figure 5.6 presents the responses in the star chart form.
















 Criminal court decisions
 Arbitration court decisions
 Political contributions
 Patronage
 Taxes and regulations
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100% (Major impact)
The responses on the different forms of grand corruption can be used to create indices to measure the
extent of state capture at different levels of government. The following indices are presented below:
legislative capture defined as the sale of Parliamentary votes or Presidential decrees (Figure 5.7); capture
of the Central Bank defined as mishandling of funds (Figure 5.8); legal capture defined as sale of
arbitration or criminal court decisions (Figure 5.9);  non-transparent political party financing defined as
contributions by private interests to political parties and election campaigns (Figure 5.10).  A composite
index of state capture is presented in Figure 5.11, constructed as the average proportion of firms reporting
that each of these components of grand corruption is a problem.
The survey also allows the identification of a group of firms willing to admit to purchasing laws and
decrees.  Further work will investigate the characteristics of firms that actively engage in capturing the
state and the affects of such state capture on firm performance.
18
                                                     
18 See Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (forthcoming)22
Figure 5.7: Legislative Capture: Sale of Parliamentary votes on laws to private interests, or sale of

































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.10: Non transparent political party finance:





































































































































































































































Finally, two more dimensions of corruption are presented: patronage defined as public officials hiring
their friends and relatives into official positions (Figure 5.12); and petty corruption in the sense of bribes
to public officials to avoid taxes and regulations (Figure 5.13).


























































































































































































































 Taxation and corruption
The survey also investigates whether firms would be willing to pay additional taxes to eliminate
corruption, crime and bureaucracy.  The unwillingness to pay additional taxes to deal with such problems
could be interpreted in two ways: these problems are not necessarily imposing substantial costs on firms
or the state in question suffers from such low credibility that firms are not willing to agree to any
additional taxation regardless of the costs.  To the extent that firms are willing to pay additional taxes
despite low state credibility, the responses to these questions presented in Figure 5.14 underestimate the
true costs imposed on firms by these institutional failures.




















































































Perceptions of the legal system
The legal system is a crucial institution in a market economy.  Firms and individuals need to know that
contracts will be honoured, their private property respected, and in the event of a disagreement that the
courts are capable of deciding the matter in a fair and affordable manner. Firms were asked their26
perceptions of the legal system on a number of different dimensions; their responses are presented in star
chart form in Figure 5.15.  Figure 5.16 presents an index of corruption in the legal system.
Figure 5.15: Thinking about your country’s legal system, how often do you associate the following












 Fair and impartial
 Honest and uncorrupt
 Quick
 Affordable
 Consistent and reliable
 Able to enforce its decisions
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100% (Very Good)















































































































Corruption, state capture and weak legal systems undermine property and contract rights with significant
consequences for investment and, ultimately, growth. Firms were asked to assess the security of their
property and contract rights.  The results are presented in Figure 5.17.27
Figure 5.17: To what degree do you agree with this statement? “I am confident that the legal system will
uphold my contract and property rights in business disputes.”

















































































































3 years ago Today
Predictability
In many respects, the most important public good that the state can provide from the point of view of
business is predictability in the institutional and policy environment.  Unpredictable changes in
government policy or regulations increase risk in the business environment and produce large
disincentives for investment.  The survey asked firms to assess the predictability of government policies
and laws; the results are presented in Figure 5.18.
Figure 5.18: How predictable are changes in the government’s economic and financial policies which
materially affect your business?

























































































































Economic/ financial policies Rules, laws and regulations
 Predictability over time
Firms were also asked whether there has been any change in the unpredictability of government actions
over the past three years (Figure 5.19).28
Figure 5.19: Using this scale, can you please tell me, how have the laws, regulations and policies












































Percentage of firms reporting negative or positive changes
Somewhat less predictable Much less predictable Somewhat more predictable Much more predictable
Negative Change Positive Change
Attitudes of the government towards business
A key component in fostering private enterprise is that the government communicates a positive and
encouraging attitude towards business and entrepreneurship. Figure 5.20 gives the firms’ assessment of
the helpfulness of the central government; Figure 5.21 reports the assessments of the local government.






































Percentage of firms reporting a non-neutral attitude of central government towards business
Mildly unhelpful Very unhelpful Mildly helpful Very helpful
Positive range Negative range29






































Percentage of firms reporting a non-neutral attitude of local/regional government towards business
Mildly unhelpful Very unhelpful Mildly helpful Very helpful
Negative range Positive range
Overall perceptions of government services
In addition to the previous questions focusing on detailed aspects of governance, it is useful to capture in a
single measure a summary of the respondents’ perceptions about the efficiency of the government.
Although crude, such a measure is likely to be at least as important as consideration of particular
institutional problems when firms make major decisions such as investment.  Figure 5.22 presents the
responses on this issue.








































































































Mostly efficient Efficient Very efficient30
Barter
Large economic distortions are associated with the use of barter as the means of payment.  Figure 5.23
shows the average percentage of sales which firms conduct in barter.
Figure 5.23: What share of your firm’s sales are now conducted in barter, offsets or bills of exchange


















































































3 years ago Today
Bureaucracy and state intervention in the firm – micro dimensions of
governance
The regulatory environment
This group of questions concerns the regulatory environment, by which is meant the direct dealings
between firms and officials who have been granted some form of control over the firm.  Key issues are
again the predictability and transparency with which these control rights are exercised and the resulting
costs imposed on firms.
Information on rules and regulations
An important component of a transparent and predictable regulatory environment is that information on
the rules and regulations by which firms are to be constrained is easily available. Firms were asked how
easy it is to obtain such information (Figure 5.24).
Figure 5.24: To what degree do you agree with this statement?  “Information on the laws and regulations
affecting my firm is easy to obtain”
Responses:
1 Fully agree
2 Agree in most
cases









































































































Fully agree Agree in most cases Tend to agree31
Interpretation of rules and regulations
The implementation of rules and regulations leaves a large degree of discretion to the state’s officials.
Figure 5.25 presents the firms’ responses on the consistency and predictability of regulation.
Figure 5.25: To what degree do you agree with the statement, “Interpretations of regulations affecting
my firm are consistent and predictable”, today and three years ago?
Responses:
1 Fully agree
2 Agree in most
cases












































































































3 years ago Today
The regulatory burden
The survey investigates firms’ perspectives on the extent of the regulatory burden for their business,
focusing on a number of different areas of regulation.  This highlights specific areas in which the
regulatory burden is considered particularly excessive.  Figure 5.26 illustrates the responses in the star
chart form.

















 Foreign exchange regulations
 Environmental regulations
 Fire and safety regulations
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100% (Major Obstacle)
In addition firms were asked which of the above obstacles they regard as the most important for their
business.  In every country, high taxes and tax regulations constituted the most significant obstacle to
business for the overwhelming majority respondents.32
State intervention
The most direct form of regulation is intervention by the state in firm decisions.  Firms were asked how
frequently the state directly intervenes in investment, employment, sales, prices, mergers, dividends and
wages.   Responses comprised always, mostly, frequently, sometimes, seldom, never.  Table 5.27 presents
the percentage of firms responding frequently or more together with a composite index calculated as the
average across each dimension of intervention.
Table 5.27: The percentage of firms subject to state intervention
Country Investment Employment Sales Prices Mergers Dividends Wages Average
Armenia 5.8 4.4 6.3 7.9 6.5 5.5 6.5 6.1
Azerbaijan 18.6 13.7 7.7 8.4 7.1 7.1 6.0 9.8
Belarus 21.7 10.2 50.0 77.5 20.8 8.0 44.2 33.2
Bulgaria 8.0 3.5 11.1 17.5 9.3 9.5 12.4 10.2
Croatia 8.8 2.4 5.6 6.4 13.5 5.1 7.9 7.1
Czech Republic 18.5 11.9 11.4 13.4 11.1 7.8 15.3 12.8
Estonia 6.3 0.8 3.9 7.7 7.3 3.9 8.5 5.5
Georgia 13.8 7.1 11.2 13.6 7.3 8.2 11.0 10.3
Hungary 24.5 21.6 21.1 27.6 20.8 33.0 42.1 27.3
Kazakhstan 14.9 6.8 13.8 27.0 14.4 9.5 12.4 14.1
Kyrgyzstan 15.4 9.4 20.0 30.3 17.9 9.9 8.3 15.9
Lithuania 10.0 6.5 14.8 15.0 13.2 14.9 17.7 13.2
Moldova 13.3 5.1 17.2 33.6 14.7 15.5 14.1 16.2
Poland 11.0 8.2 4.5 5.1 8.3 6.4 12.2 8.0
Romania 21.4 4.9 7.8 17.5 8.1 12.9 19.5 13.2
Russia 9.1 5.1 18.2 29.7 9.3 3.0 6.5 11.5
Slovakia 30.3 34.1 35.2 50.0 12.5 7.4 43.1 30.4
Slovenia 15.7 20.3 13.2 12.4 13.1 11.6 26.0 16.1
Ukraine 22.1 10.8 23.1 30.0 11.4 9.8 24.4 18.8
Uzbekistan 22.0 7.4 24.1 32.5 12.8 12.5 29.6 20.1
Over-employment
Given the previous commitment under communism to full employment, the state still intervenes indirectly
in the employment decisions of firms.  Figure 5.28 presents responses on how far current employment
levels differ from the desired levels, with skilled and unskilled workers considered separately.33
Figure 5.28: Given your firm’s current level of output and existing capital stock, how does the current
level of skilled and unskilled workers compare with the desired level?
Responses:
1 Too high by
more than
20%;
2 Too high by
10-20%;



















































































































































Too high by more than 20% Too high by 10-20% Too high by 5-10%
Time spent with government officials
The time that senior managers have to spend dealing with government officials provides a measure of the
burden that regulation places on firms, since such time is not directed towards productive activity.  Figure
5.29 presents the mean responses on time spent with government officials.
Figure 5.29: What percentage of senior management’s time per year is spent in dealing with







More than  50%
Midpoint of each
category (except






































































































The macro dimensions of corruption have been dealt with above. This section investigates the micro
characteristics of the corruption transaction.  The dimensions of interest include the frequency and level of
bribery (in the sense of the additional tax burden that corruption imposes on firms), uncertainties
associated with corruption, the recipients of bribes, the extent of bribery associated with public
procurement and the extent to which there is bureaucratic accountability in the provision of public
services.34
Frequency of bribery
Firms were asked how frequently they face demands for bribes.  Since a high frequency of bribery need
not be associated with a high level of bribes (or implicit tax rate), this is closer to a measure of how
ingrained corrupt practices are within the bureaucracy than a measure of the economic cost imposed by
that corruption.  Figure 5.30 gives the responses.
 Figure 5.30: How often would you say the following statement is true?  “It is common for firms in my



























































































Firms were asked to estimate the additional tax burden, as a proportion of revenues, imposed on them by
corruption. This presents one of the most direct measures of corruption in the survey.  The question was
posed in terms of firm revenues rather than profits since estimates of revenues are more reliable; firms in
transition economies frequently face significant incentives to misreport profits.
Firms were only asked to answer this question if they replied that they ever paid bribes in response to the
previous question.  The proportion of such firms in each country is given in Figure 5.31.  Such a response
may be regarded as genuine non-payment or an unwillingness to discuss the subject.  In any case the
results presented in Figure 5.32 should be interpreted as the average additional tax imposed by bribery
among those firms admitting to paying bribes.



























































































Figure 5.32: On average, what percent of revenues do firms like yours typically pay per annum in































































































Uncertainties associated with bribery
The key difference between corrupt and non-corrupt transactions is that corrupt transactions do not
represent a legally enforceable agreement between the official and the firm.  As a result, corruption is
frequently a source of substantial uncertainty for the firm. The survey asked firms about various forms of
uncertainty connected with bribery; the responses are presented in Figures 5.33 to 5.35.  Only those firms
which stated that they pay bribes frequently or more are included below since such uncertainty is
unimportant if the firm only pays bribes infrequently.




















































































































Figure 5.34:  If a firm pays the required additional payment to a particular government official, another









































































































































































































































































The recipients of bribes
The bribes paid by firms can be dis-aggregated according to different "services". The survey asked about
the proportion of bribes paid each year for the following purposes: to get connected to and maintain public
services; to get licenses and permits; to deal with taxes and tax collection; to gain government contracts;
to deal with customs/imports; to deal with courts; to deal with health/fire inspectors; and to influence the
content of new legislation, rules or decrees.
Table 5.36 presents the average proportion of bribes spent on each service.  The results have not been
weighted so firms paying a small amount of bribes carry as much weight as those paying a lot.37













Armenia 10.9 9.8 30.6 5.8 14.0 4.7 2.9 3.2 18.0 100.0
Azerbaijan 9.2 20.2 31.6 17.4 8.6 6.0 4.3 2.4 0.1 100.0
Belarus 9.6 30.4 28.2 7.3 7.1 3.6 13.6 0.2 0.0 100.0
Bulgaria 17.7 22.6 14.1 6.6 11.9 13.6 8.2 2.8 2.6 100.0
Croatia 9.1 6.7 7.3 44.7 10.7 8.8 4.1 4.0 4.5 100.0
Czech
Republic
8.3 16.3 7.2 43.0 6.4 6.5 9.2 1.6 1.6 100.0
Estonia 2.0 26.5 6.4 34.5 15.2 2.5 4.2 5.9 2.8 100.0
Georgia 11.0 18.3 29.3 3.6 9.6 11.3 10.4 6.6 0.0 100.0
Hungary 7.3 43.6 10.9 11.1 14.2 3.1 3.3 1.4 4.9 100.0
Kazakhstan 10.7 23.2 20.3 5.3 14.4 12.7 9.5 1.3 2.8 100.0
Kyrgyzstan 5.0 15.2 53.5 6.5 6.8 4.5 7.4 1.1 0.0 100.0
Lithuania 14.0 8.5 16.3 5.0 15.1 8.7 17.6 4.3 10.6 100.0
Moldova 14.9 29.7 21.4 3.9 10.4 9.0 7.0 1.6 2.2 100.0
Poland 7.4 26.1 8.8 17.7 15.8 9.9 5.7 4.3 4.3 100.0
Romania 16.1 39.8 6.3 7.8 15.2 5.2 5.7 3.4 0.6 100.0
Russia 11.7 20.4 18.5 11.3 8.8 11.1 11.6 2.8 3.7 100.0
Slovakia 5.7 33.2 10.1 18.3 11.8 12.9 4.3 1.3 2.5 100.0
Slovenia 6.5 24.9 4.3 36.3 8.7 5.3 5.8 8.2 0.0 100.0
Ukraine 10.3 21.3 25.8 10.4 12.2 6.8 9.7 2.5 1.1 100.0
Uzbekistan 8.5 18.0 27.9 15.4 10.9 5.2 12.0 0.9 1.2 100.0
Overall 10.6 22.0 19.4 14.6 12.2 7.9 7.8 2.6 2.9 100.0
Bribery connected with public procurement
Corruption may be connected with public procurement as politicians and officials demand bribes in return
for awarding contracts.  Firms were asked what proportion of the contract value is typically offered in
bribery when doing business with the government; the responses are reported in Figure 5.37.
Figure 5.37: When firms in your industry do business with the government, how much of the contract





























































































































The opportunity for officials to engage in corruption depends in part on the discretionary power they hold
and the degree of accountability they face within the state apparatus. The survey investigates to what
degree the behaviour of officials is constrained by other non-corrupt officials, as reported in Figure 5.38.
Figure 5.38: How often is the following statement true? “If a government agent acts against the rules I
can usually go to another official or to his superior and get the correct treatment without




















































































































































Firms may try to mitigate the uncertainties caused by state policy making by becoming more involved in
the process.  Figures 5.39 and 5.40 present the responses to questions on firm membership in trade
associations and the degree to which such associations are the preferred channel for exercising influence.

























































































Figure 5.40: If so, when a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is proposed that would have a substantial










































































































Trade Association Direct ties Other methods
Degree of influence over the state
Firms engage in lobbying to exercise influence.  Figure 5.41 presents the firms’ assessment of the degree
of influence that they wield at different levels of government - the executive, legislature, ministries and
regulatory agencies.  In addition, firms in Russia were asked the same questions about their local
government.  Note that the star charts are scaled relative to a maximum of 30% of firms reporting being
influential.
Figure 5.41: When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a substantial
impact on your business, how much influence does your firm typically have at the national















Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bulgaria Croatia
Czech Republic Estonia Georgia Hungary Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania
Russia Russia (local) Slovakia Slovenia Ukraine
Uzbekistan 30% (Significant influence)40
Arrears
The state may indirectly subsidise firms by condoning arrears.  Figure 5.42 shows the proportion of firms
with such arrears.
Figure 5.42: Is the amount of payments overdue (by more than 90 days) by your company to each of the










































































Utilites Government Local government
Subsidies
More directly, subsidies form one component of the nexus of transactions that tie together firms and the
state.  Figure 5.43 and 5.44 illustrate the current proportion of firms receiving subsidies and the change in
the level of subsidies over the last three years.
Figure 5.43: Does your enterprise receive subsidies (including tolerance of tax arrears) from local or











































































3 Years ago Now41









responding 1 or  2;
Positive range:
percentage of firms

























Percentage of firms reporting a change in the level of subsidies in the last three years
Slightly less Substantially less Slightly more Substantially more
Negative change Positive change
 6. Selected results by firm characteristics
The firms in the sample differ according to the many characteristics highlighted in section 4. It is thus
possible to investigate systematic differences in perceptions along these other dimensions of variation.
This section presents a few selected results on the discriminatory consequences of state actions according
to the origins of the responding firm.  The firms are divided into the following categories:
•  New Private: comprising all private firms with no state-owned predecessor
•  Privatised: comprising all private firms which were formerly state owned
•  State Owned: comprising all those firms still in state ownership
In addition we partition the firms into:
•  Small: comprising all firms with fewer than 50 employees
•  Medium: comprising all firms with between 50 and 500 employees
•  Large: comprising all firms with more than 500 employees
Bribes Paid
There are significant differences in both the frequency and the level of bribes paid by firms in different
categories.  Across the whole sample bribery is a particularly serious disadvantage for new private firms
and constitutes a regressive tax with respect to firm size.  See Figure 5.32 and Figure 5.30 for the
corresponding charts by country.  Recall that the average level of bribery is calculated from the sub-
sample of firms that admit to paying bribes at all.42




























































































































































































































Time spent with government officials
There is also evidence that firms in different categories spend differing amounts of time dealing with
government officials.  See Figure 5.29 for the corresponding chart by country.43
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